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Chapter 2
The Trusted Cloud: 
Addressing Security and 
Compliance
In Chapter 1 we reviewed the essential cloud concepts and took a first look at cloud 
security. We noted that the traditional notion of perimeter or endpoint protection 
left much to be desired in the traditional architecture with enterprise-owned 
assets. Such a notion is even less adequate today when we add the challenges 
that application developers, service providers, application architects, data center 
operators, and users face in the emerging cloud environment.
In this chapter we’ll bring the level of discourse one notch tighter and focus 
on defining the issues that drive cloud security. We’ll go through a set of initial 
considerations and common definitions as prescribed by industry standards. We’ll also 
look at current pain points in the industry regarding security and the challenges involved 
in addressing those pains.
Beyond these considerations, we first take a look at the solution space: the concept 
of a trusted infrastructure and usages to be implemented in a trusted cloud, starting 
with a trust chain that consists of hardware that supports boot integrity. Then, we take 
advantage of that trust chain to implement data protection, equally at rest and in motion 
and during application execution, to support application run-time integrity and offer 
protection in the top layer.
Finally, we look briefly at some of the “to be” scenarios for users who are able to put 
these recommendations into practice.
Security Considerations for the Cloud
One of the biggest barriers to broader adoption of cloud computing is security—the real 
and perceived risks of providing, accessing, and controlling services in a multi-tenant 
cloud environment. IT managers would like to see higher levels of assurance before they 
can declare their cloud-based services and data ready for prime time, similar to the level 
of trust they have in corporate-owned infrastructure. Organizations require their compute 
platforms to be secure and compliant with relevant rules, regulations, and laws. These 
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requirements must be met, whether deployment uses a dedicated service available via a 
private cloud or is a service shared with other subscribers via a public cloud. There’s no 
margin for error when it comes to security. According to a research study conducted by 
the Ponemon Institute and Symantec, the average cost to an organization of a data breach 
in 2013 was $5.4 million, and the corresponding cost of lost business came to about  
$3 million.1 It is the high cost of such data breaches and the inadequate security monitoring 
capabilities offered as part of the cloud services that pose the greatest threats to wider 
adoption of cloud computing and that create resistance within organizations to public 
cloud services.
From an IT manager’s perspective, cloud computing architectures bypass or work 
against traditional security tools and frameworks. The ease with which services are 
migrated and deployed in a cloud environment brings significant benefits, but they 
are a bane from a compliance and security perspective. Therefore, this chapter focuses 
on the security challenges involved in deploying and managing services in a cloud 
infrastructure. To serve as an example, we describe work that Intel is doing with partners 
and the software vendor ecosystem to enable a security-enhanced platform and solutions 
with security anchored and rooted in hardware and firmware. The goal of this effort is to 
increase security visibility and control in the cloud.
Cloud computing describes the pooling of an on-demand, self-managed virtual 
infrastructure, consumed as a service. This approach abstracts applications from the 
complexity of the underlying infrastructure, allowing IT to focus on enabling greater 
business value and innovation instead of getting bogged down by technology deployment 
details. Organizations welcome the presumed cost savings and business flexibility 
associated with cloud deployments. However, IT practitioners unanimously cite 
security, control, and IT compliance as primary issues that slow the adoption of cloud 
computing. These considerations often denote general concerns about privacy, trust, 
change management, configuration management, access controls, auditing, and logging. 
Many customers also have specific security requirements that mandate control over data 
location, isolation, and integrity. These requirements have traditionally been met through 
a fixed hardware infrastructure.
At the current state of cloud computing, the means to verify a service’s compliance 
are labor-intensive, inconsistent, non-scalable, or just plain impractical to implement. 
The necessary data, APIs, and tools are not available from the provider. Process 
mismatches occur when service providers and consumers work under different 
operating models. For these reasons, many corporations deploy less critical applications 
in the public cloud and restrict their sensitive applications to dedicated hardware 
and traditional IT architecture running in a corporate-owned vertical infrastructure. 
For business-critical applications and processes, and for sensitive data, third-party 
attestations of security controls usually aren’t enough. In such cases, it is absolutely 
critical for organizations to be able to ascertain that the underlying cloud infrastructure is 
secure enough for the intended use.
1https://www4.symantec.com/mktginfo/whitepaper/053013_GL_NA_WP_Ponemon-2013-
Cost-of-a-Data-Breach-Report_daiNA_cta72382.pdf
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This requirement thus drives the next frontier of cloud security and compliance: 
implementing a level of transparency at the lowest layers of the cloud, through the 
development of standards, instrumentation, tools, and linkages to monitor and prove 
that the IaaS cloud’s physical and virtual servers are actually performing as they should 
be and that they meet defined security criteria. The expectation is that the security of a 
cloud service should match or exceed the equivalent in house capabilities before it can be 
considered an appropriate replacement.
Today, security mechanisms in the lower stack layers (for example, hardware, 
firmware, and hypervisors) are almost absent. The demand for security is higher for 
externally sourced services. In particular, the requirements for transparency are higher: 
while certain monitoring and logging capabilities might not have been deemed necessary 
for an in-house component, they become absolute necessities when sourced from 
third parties to support operations, meet SLA compliance, and have audit trails should 
litigation and forensics become necessary. On the positive side, the use of cloud services 
will likely drive the re-architecturing of crusty applications with much higher levels of 
transparency and scalability with, we hope, moderate cost impact due to the greater 
efficiency the cloud brings.
Cloud providers and the IT community are working earnestly to address these 
requirements, allowing cloud services to be deployed and managed with predictable 
outcomes, with controls and policies in place to monitor trust and compliance of these 
services in cloud infrastructures. Specifically, Intel Corporation and other technology 
companies have come together to enable a highly secure cloud infrastructure based on 
a hardware root of trust, providing tamper-proof measurements of physical and virtual 
components in the computing stack, including hypervisors. These collaborations are 
working to develop a framework that integrates the secure hardware measurements 
provided by the hardware root of trust with adjoining virtualization and cloud 
management software. The intent is to improve visibility, control, and compliance for 
cloud services. For example, making the trust and integrity of the cloud servers visible 
will allow cloud orchestrators to provide improved controls of on boarding services for 
their more sensitive workloads, offering more secure hardware and subsequently better 
control over the migration of workloads and greater ability to deliver on security policies.
Security requirements for cloud use are still works in progress, let alone firming 
up the security aspects proper. Let’s look at some of the security issues being captured, 
defined, and specified by the government and standards organizations.
Cloud Security, Trust, and Assurance
There is significant focus on and activity across various standards organizations and 
forums to define the challenges facing cloud security, as well as solutions to those 
challenges. The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA), NIST, and the Open Cloud Computing 
Interface (OCCI) are examples of organizations promoting cloud security standards. The 
Open Data Center Alliance (ODCA), an alliance of customers, recognizes that security 
is the biggest challenge organizations face as they plan for migration to cloud services. 
The ODCA is developing usage models that provide standardized definitions for security 
in the cloud services and detailed procedures for service providers to demonstrate 
compliance with those standards. These attempts seek to give organizations an ability to 
validate adherence to security standards within the cloud services.
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Here are some important considerations dominating the current work on cloud 
security:
•	 Visibility, compliance, and monitoring. Ways are needed to 
provide seamless access to security controls, conditions, and 
operating states within a cloud’s virtualization and hardware 
layers for auditability and at the bottom-most infrastructure layers 
of the cloud security providers. The measured evidence enables 
organizations to comply with security policies and with regulated 
data standards and controls such as FISMA and DPA (NIST 2005).
•	 Data discovery and protection. Cloud computing places data in 
new and different places—not just user data but also application 
and VM data (source). Key issues include data location and 
segregation, data footprints, backup, and recovery.
•	 Architecture. Standardized infrastructure and applications 
provide opportunities to exploit a single vulnerability many times 
over. This is the BORE (Break Once, Run Everywhere) principle at 
work. Considerations for the architecture include:
•	 Protection. Protecting against attacks with standardized 
infrastructure when the same vulnerability can exist at many 
places, owing to the standardization.
•	 Support for multi-tenant environments. Ensuring that 
systems and applications from different tenants are isolated 
from one another appropriately.
•	 Security policies. Making sure that security policies are 
accurately and fully implemented across cloud architectures.
•	 Identity management. Identity management (IdM) is described 
as “the management of individual identities, their authentication, 
authorization, roles, and privileges/permissions within or across 
system and enterprise boundaries, with the goal of increasing 
security and productivity while decreasing cost, downtime, and 
repetitive tasks.” From a cloud security perspective, questions like, 
“How do you control passwords and access tokens in the cloud?” 
and “How do you federate identity in the cloud?” are very real, 
thorny questions for cloud providers and subscribers.
•	 Automation and policy orchestration. The efficiency, scale, 
flexibility, and cost-effectiveness that cloud computing brings 
are because of the automation—the ability to rapidly deploy 
resources, and to scale up and scale down with processes, 
applications, and services provisioned securely “on demand.” 
A high degree of automation and policy evaluation and 
orchestration are required so that security controls and 
protections are handled correctly, with minimal errors and 
minimal intervention needed.
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Trends Affecting Data Center Security
The industry working groups that are addressing the issues identified above are carrying 
on their activities with some degree of urgency, driven as they are by a number of 
circumstances and events. There are three overriding security considerations applicable 
to data centers, namely:
New types of attacks•	
Changes in IT systems architecture as a transformation to the •	
cloud environment takes place
Increased governmental and international compliance •	
requirements because of the exploits
The nature and types of attacks on information systems are changing dramatically. 
That is, the threat landscape is changing. Attackers are evolving from being hackers 
working on their own and looking for personal fame into organized, sophisticated 
attackers targeting specific types of data and seeking to gain and retain control of assets. 
These attacks are concerted, stealthy, and organized. The attacks have predominantly 
targeted operating systems and application environments, but new attacks are no longer 
confined to software and operating systems. Increasingly, they are moving lower down 
in the solution stacks to the platform, and they are affecting entities such as the BIOS, 
various firmware sites in the platform, and the hypervisor running on the bare-metal 
system. The attackers find it is easy to hide there, and the number of controls at that level 
is still minimal, so leverage is significant. Imagine, in a multi-tenant cloud environment, 
what impact malware can have if it gets control of a hypervisor.
Similarly, the evolving IT architecture is creating new security challenges. Risks 
exist anywhere there are connected systems. It does not help that servers, whether in 
a traditional data center or in a cloud implementation, were designed to be connected 
systems. Today, there is an undeniable trend toward virtualization, outsourcing, and 
cross-business and cross-supply chain collaboration, which blurs the boundaries 
between data “inside” an organization and data “outside” that organization. Drawing 
perimeters around these abstract and dynamic models is quite a challenge, and that 
may not even be practical anymore. The traditional perimeter-defined models aren’t 
as effective as they once were. Perhaps they never were, but the cloud brings these 
issues to the point they can’t be ignored anymore. The power of that cloud computing 
and virtualization lies in the abstraction, whereby workloads can migrate for efficiency, 
reliability, and optimization.
This fungibility of infrastructure, therefore, compounds the security and compliance 
problems. A vertically owned infrastructure at least provided the possibility of running 
critical applications with high security and with successfully meeting compliance 
requirements. But this view becomes unfeasible in a multi-tenant environment. With the 
loss of visibility comes the question of how to verify the integrity of the infrastructure on 
which an organization’s workloads are instantiated and run.
Adding to the burden of securing more data in these abstract models is a growing 
legal or regulatory compliance demand to secure personally identifiable data, intellectual 
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property, or financial data. The risks (and costs) of non-compliance continue to grow. 
The Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) and the Federal Risk 
and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) are two examples of how non-
compliance prevents the cloud service providers from competing in the public sector. 
But even if cloud providers aren’t planning to compete in the public sector by offering 
government agencies their cloud services, it’s still important that they have at least a basic 
understanding of both programs. That’s because the federal government is the largest 
single producer, collector, consumer, and disseminator of information in the United 
States. Any changes in regulatory requirements that affect government agencies will also 
have the potential of significantly affecting the commercial sector. These trends have 
major bearing on the security and compliance challenges that organizations face as they 
consider migrating their workloads to the cloud.
As mentioned, corporate-owned infrastructure can presumably provide a security 
advantage by virtue of its being inside the enterprise perimeter. The first defense is 
security by obscurity. Resources inside the enterprise, especially inside a physical 
perimeter, are difficult for intruders to reach. The second defense is genetic diversity. 
Given that IT processes vary from company to company, an action that breaches one 
company’s security may not work for another company’s. However, these presumed 
advantages are unintended, and therefore difficult to quantify; in practice, they offer little 
comfort or utility.
Security and Compliance Challenges
The four basic security and compliance challenges that organizations face are as follows:
•	 Governance. Cloud computing abstracts the infrastructure, and 
in order to prove compliance and satisfy audit requirements, 
organizations rely on the cloud providers to supply logs, reports, 
and attestation. When companies outsource parts of their IT 
infrastructure to cloud providers, they effectively give up some 
control of their information infrastructure and processes, even 
as they are required to bear greater responsibility for data 
confidentiality and compliance. While enterprises still get to 
define how their information is handled, who gets access to that 
information, and under what conditions in their private or hybrid 
clouds, they must largely take cloud providers at their word that 
their SLA trusting security policies and conditions are being 
met. Even then, service customers may have to compromise 
to have the capabilities that cloud providers can deliver. The 
organization’s ability to monitor actual activities and verify 
security conditions within the cloud is usually very limited, 
and there are no standards or commercial tools to validate 
conformance to policies and SLAs.
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•	 Co-Tenancy and Noisy or Adversarial Neighbors. Cloud 
computing introduces new risks resulting from multi-tenancy, an 
environment in which different users within a cloud share physical 
resources to run their virtual machines. Creating secure partitions 
between co-residental virtual machines has proved challenging 
for many cloud providers. Results range from the unintentional, 
noisy-neighbor syndrome whereby workloads that consume more 
than their fair share of compute, storage, or I/O resources starve 
the other virtual tenants on that host; to the deliberately malicious 
efforts, such as when malware is injected into the virtualization 
layer, enabling hostile parties to monitor and control any of 
the virtual machines residing on the system. To test this idea, 
researchers at UCSD and MIT were able to pinpoint the physical 
server used by programs running on the EC2 cloud, and then 
extract small amounts of data from these programs by inserting 
their own software and launching a side-channel attack.2
•	 Architecture and Applications. Cloud services are typically 
virtualized, which adds a hypervisor layer to a traditional IT 
application stack. This new layer introduces opportunities for 
improvements in security and compliance, but it also creates 
new attack surfaces and different risk exposure. Organizations 
must evaluate the new monitoring opportunities and the risks 
presented by the hypervisor layer, and account for them in their 
policy definition and compliance reporting.
•	 Data. Cloud services raise access and protection issues for user 
data and applications, including source code. Who has access, and 
what is left behind when an organization scales down a service? 
How is corporate confidential data protected from the virtual 
infrastructure administrators and cloud co-tenants? Encryption 
of data, at rest, in transit, and eventually in use, becomes a basic 
requirement, yet it comes with a performance cost (penalty).  
If we truly want to encrypt everywhere, how is it done in a  
cost-effective and efficient manner? Finally, data destruction 
at end of life is a subject not often discussed. There are clear 
regulations on how long data has to be retained. The assumption 
is that data gets destroyed or disposed of once the retention period 
expires. Examples of these regulations include Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX), Section 802: seven years (U.S. Security and Exchange 
Commission 2003); HIPAA, 45 C.F.R. §164.530(j): six years; and 
FACTA Disposal Rule (Federal Trade Commission 2005).
2S. Curry, J. Darbyshire, Douglas Fisher, et al., RSA Security Brief, March 2010. Also, T. Ristenpart, 
E. Tromer, et al., Hey, You, Get Off of My Cloud: Exploring Information Leakage in Third-Party 
Compute Clouds, CCS’09, Chicago.
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With many organizations using cloud services today for non-mission-critical 
operations or for low-confidentiality applications, security and compliance challenges 
seem manageable, but this is a policy of avoidance. These services don’t deal with 
data and applications governed by strict information security policies such as health 
regulations, FISMA regulations, and the Data Protection Act in Europe. But the security 
and compliance challenges mentioned above would become central to cloud providers 
and subscribers once these higher-value business functions and data begin migrating 
to private cloud and hybrid clouds. Industry pundits believe that the cloud value 
proposition will increasingly drive the migration of these higher value applications, as 
well as information and business processes, to cloud infrastructures. As more and more 
sensitive data and business-critical processes move to these cloud environments, the 
implications for security officers in these organizations will be to provide a transparent 
and compliant framework for information security, with monitoring.
So how do IT people address these challenges and requirements? With the concept 
of trusted clouds. This answer addresses many of these challenges and provides the 
ability for organizations to migrate both regular and mission-critical applications so as to 
leverage the benefits of cloud computing.
Trusted Clouds
There are many definitions and industry descriptions for the term trusted cloud, but at the 
core these definitions all have four foundational pillars:
A trusted computing infrastructure•	
A trusted cloud identity and access management•	
Trusted software and applications•	
Operations and risk management•	
Each of these pillars is broad and goes deep, with a rich cohort of technologies, 
patterns of development, and of course security considerations. It is not possible to cover 
all of them in one book. Since this book deals with the infrastructure for cloud security, 
we focus on the first pillar, the trusted infrastructure, and leave the others for future 
work. (Identity and access management are covered very briefly within the context of 
the trusted infrastructure.) But before we delve into this subject, let’s review some key 
security concepts to ensure clarity in the discussion. These terms lay the foundation for 
what visibility, compliance, and monitoring entail, and we start with baseline definitions 
for trust and assurance.
•	 Trust. The assurance and confidence that people, data, entities, 
information, and processes will function or behave in expected 
ways. Trust may be human-to-human, machine-to-machine 
(e.g., handshake protocols negotiated within certain protocols), 
human-to-machine (e.g., when a consumer reviews a digital 
signature advisory notice on a website), or machine-to-human. 
At a deeper level, trust might be regarded as a consequence of 
progress toward achieving security or privacy objectives.
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•	 Assurance. Evidence or grounds for confidence that the security 
controls implemented within an information system are effective 
in their application. Assurance can be shown in:
Actions taken by developers, implementers, and operators •	
in the specification, design, development, implementation, 
operation, and maintenance of security controls.
Actions taken by security control assessors to determine the •	
extent to which those controls are implemented correctly, 
operating as intended, and producing the desired outcomes 
with respect to meeting the security requirements for the 
system.
With these definitions established, let’s now take a look at the trusted computing 
infrastructure, where computing infrastructure embraces three domains: compute, 
storage, and network.
Trusted Computing Infrastructure
Trusted computing infrastructure systems consistently behave in expected ways, with 
hardware and software working together to enforce these behaviors. The behaviors are 
consistent across compute on servers, storage, and network elements in the data center.
In the traditional infrastructure, hardware is a bystander to security measures, as 
most of the malware prevention, detection, and remediation is handled by software in the 
operating system, applications, or services layers. This approach is no longer adequate, 
however, as software layers have become more easily circumvented or corrupted. To 
deliver on the promise of trusted clouds, a better approach is the creation of a root of 
trust at the most foundational layer of a system—that is, in the hardware. Then, that root 
of trust grows upward, into and through the operating system, applications, and services 
layers. This new security approach is known as hardware-based or hardware-assisted 
security, and it becomes the basis for enabling the trusted clouds.
Trusted computing relies on cryptographic and measurement techniques to 
enforce a selected behavior by authenticating the launch and authorizing processes. 
This authentication allows an entity to verify that only authorized code runs on a system. 
Though this typically covers initial booting, it may also include applications and scripts. 
Establishing trust for a particular component implies also an ability to establish trust for 
that component relative to other trusted components. This transitive trust path is known 
as the chain of trust, with the initial component being the root of trust.
A system of geometry is built on a set of postulates assumed to be true. Likewise, a 
trusted computing infrastructure starts with a root of trust that contains a set of trusted 
elemental functions assumed to be immune from physical and other attacks. Since an 
important requirement for trust is that conditions be tamper-proof, cryptography or some 
immutable unique signature is used to identify a component. The hardware platform is 
usually a good proxy for the root of trust; for most attackers, the risk, cost, and difficulty of 
tampering with hardware exceeds the potential benefits of attempting to do so.
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With the use of hardware as the initial root of trust, you can then measure (which 
means taking a hash, like an MD5 or SHA1, of the image of component or components) 
the software, such as the hypervisor or operating system, to determine whether 
unauthorized modifications have been made to it. In this way, a chain of trust relative 
to the hardware can be established. Trust techniques include hardware encryption, 
signing, machine authentication, secure key storage, and attestation. Encryption and 
signing are well-known techniques, but these are hardened by the placement of keys in 
protected hardware storage. Machine authentication provides a user with a higher level 
of assurance, as the machine is indicated as known and authenticated. Attestation, which 
is covered in Chapter 4, provides the means for a third party (also called a trusted third 
party) to affirm that loaded firmware and software are correct, true, or genuine. This is 
particularly important for cloud architectures based on virtualization.
Trusted Cloud Usage Models
In this abstracted and fungible cloud environment, the focus needs to be on enabling 
security across the three infrastructure domains. Only then can an enterprise have 
an infrastructure that is trusted to enable the broad migration of critical applications. 
Mitigating risk becomes more complex, as cloud use introduces an ever-expanding, 
transient chain of custody for sensitive data and applications. Only when security is 
addressed in a transparent and auditable way can enterprises and developers have:
Confidence that their applications and workloads are equally safe •	
in multi-tenant clouds
Greater visibility and control of the operational state of the •	
infrastructure, to balance the loss of physical control that comes 
with this abstracted environment
Capability to continuously monitor for compliance•	
Cloud consumers may not articulate the needs in this fashion. From their 
perspective, there are key mega-needs, such as:
How can I trust the cloud enough to use it?•	
How can I protect my application and workloads in the  •	
cloud—and from the cloud?
How can I broker between device and cloud services to ensure •	
trust and security?
A cloud provider has to address these questions in a meaningful way for its 
tenants. These needs translate into a set of foundational usage models for trusted 
clouds that apply across the three infrastructure domains, as shown in Figure 2-1.







Data Protection – At Rest, In Motion, In Execution
Boot Integrity & Protection
Run-Time Integrity & Protection
Figure 2-1. A framework for the trusted cloud
 1. Boot integrity and protection
 2. Data governance and protection, at rest, in motion, and 
during execution
 3. Run-time integrity and protection
The scope and semantics of these usage models changes across the three 
infrastructure domains, but the purpose and intent are the same. How they manifest and 
are implemented in each of the domains could differ. For example, data protection in the 
context of the compute domain entails protection (both confidentiality and integrity) 
of the virtual machines at rest, in motion, and during execution; this applies to their 
configuration, state, secrets, keys, certificates, and other entities stored within. The same 
data-protection usage for the network domain has a different focus; it is on protection 
of the network flows, network isolation, confidentiality on the pipe, tenant-specific IPS, 
IDS, firewalls, deep packet inspection, and so on. In the storage domain, data protection 
pinpoints strong isolation/segregation, confidentiality, sovereignty, and integrity. Data 
confidentiality, which is a key part of data protection across the three domains, uses the 
same technological components and solutions—that is, encryption.
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As a solution provider, methodical development and instantiation of these usage 
models across all the domains will provide the necessary assurance for organizations 
migrating their critical applications to a cloud infrastructure, and will enable 
establishment of the foundational pillar for trusted clouds.
In the rest of this chapter, we provide an exposition of the usage models listed above. 
We include enough definition of these four usage models for them to provide a broad 
overview. Subsequent chapters go into greater detail on each of these models and offer 
solutions, including the solution architecture and a reference implementation using 
commercial software and management components.
The Boot Integrity Usage Model
Boot integrity represents the first step toward achieving a trusted infrastructure. This 
model applies equally well to the compute, network, and storage domains. As illustrated 
in Figure 2-1, every network switch, router, or storage controller (in a SAN or NAS) runs 
a compute layer operating specialized OS to provide networking and storage functions, 
so this model enables a service provider to make claims about the boot integrity of the 
network, storage, and compute platforms, as well as the operating system and hypervisor 
instances running in them. As discussed earlier, boot integrity supported in the hardware 
makes the system robust and less vulnerable to tampering and targeted attacks. It enables 
an infrastructure service provider to make quantifiable claims about the boot-time 
integrity of the pre-launch and the launch components. This provides a means, therefore, 
to observe and measure the integrity of the infrastructure. In a cloud infrastructure, these 
security features refer to the virtualization technology in use, which comprises two layers:
The boot integrity of the BIOS, firmware, and hypervisor. We •	
identify this capability as trusted platform boot.
The boot integrity of the virtual machines that host the workloads •	
and applications. We want these applications to run on trusted 
virtual machines.
Understanding the Value of Platform Boot Integrity
To attain trusted computing, cloud users need systems hardened against emerging 
threats such as rootkits. Historically, many have viewed these threats as someone else’s 
problem or as a purely hypothetical issue. This position is untenable in view of today’s 
threats.
The stealthy, low-level threats are real and they occur in actual operating 
environments. The recent Mebromi BIOS rootkit low-level attack on a shipping platform 
was an eye-opener, as it took the industry by surprise. Unfortunately, as is often the case, 
it takes an actual exploit to change the mindset and drive change. And indeed, there 
are many more IT managers and security professionals taking action to improve the 
situation. As of 2012, a growing number of entities, including the U.S. National Institute 
of Standards and Technologies (NIST), are developing recommendations for protecting 
a system’s boot integrity. These recommendations contain measures for securing very 
basic, but highly privileged platform components.
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Given the crucial role played by the hypervisor as essential software responsible 
for managing the underlying hardware and allocating resources such as processor, 
disk, memory, and I/O to the guest virtual machines and arbitrating the accesses and 
privileges among guests, it is imperative to have the highest levels of assurance so that it 
is uncompromised. This was the rationale for conducting the survey shown in Figure 2-2. 
With this growing awareness and concern has come a corresponding growth in vendors 
looking to define the solutions.
Figure 2-2. Survey results showing concerns over hypervisor integrity across regions
For the various devices/nodes across the infrastructure domains (compute, storage, 
and network), the integrity of the pre-launch and launch environment can be asserted 
anytime during the execution’s lifecycle. This is done by verifying that the identity and 
values of the components have not changed unless there has been a reset or a reboot of 
the platform by the controlling software. This assertion of integrity is deferred to a trusted 
third party that fulfills the role of a trust authority, and the verification process is known 
as trust attestation. The trust authority service is an essential component of a trusted 
cloud solution architecture.
The Trusted Virtual Machine Launch Usage Model
A trusted platform boot capability provides a safe launch environment for provisioning 
virtual machines running workloads. This environment has the mechanisms to evaluate 
the integrity of pre-launch and launch components on a platform, from the BIOS to the 
operating system and hypervisor. The service provider thus attests to the trust-ability 
CHAPTER 2 ■ THE TRusTEd Cloud: AddREssing sECuRiTy And ComPliAnCE
32
of the launch environment. However, no specific claims can be made about the virtual 
machines being launched, other than indicating that they are being launched on a 
measured and attested hypervisor platform. Although virtual machine monitors (VMM) 
or hypervisors are naturally good at isolating workloads from each other because they 
mediate all access to physical resources by virtual machines, they cannot by themselves 
attest and assert the state of the virtual machine that is launched.
The trusted virtual machine launch usage model applies the same level of trust-
ability to the pre-launch and launch environment of the virtual machines and workloads. 
Each virtual machine launched on a virtual machine manager and hypervisor platform 
benefits from a hardware root of trust by storing the launch measurements of the virtual 
machines’ sealing and remote attestation capabilities. However, this requires virtualizing 
the TPM, with a virtual TPM (vTPM) for each of the virtual machines. Each of these 
virtual TPM vTPM instances then emulates the functions of a hardware TPM. Currently, 
there are no real virtualized TPM implementations available, owing to the challenges 
related to virtualizing the TPM. The difficulty lies not in providing the low-level TPM 
instructions but in ensuring that the security properties are supported and established 
with an appropriate level of trust. Specifically, we have to extend the chain of trust from 
the physical TPM to each virtual TPM by carefully managing the signing keys, certificates, 
and lifecycle of all necessary elements. An added dimension is the mobility of the virtual 
machines and how these virtual TPMs would migrate with the virtual machines.
There are other ways of enabling a measured launch of virtual machines, such as 
storing the measurements in memory as part of a trusted hypervisor platform without 
the use of virtual TPMs but still ensuring that the chain of trust is extended from the 
physical TPM. Irrespective of the design approach, day-to-day operations on virtual 
machines—such as suspend and resume, creating snapshots of running virtual machines, 
and playing them back on other platforms or live migration of virtual machines—become 
challenging to implement.
There are no real production-quality implementations of these architectures. 
There are few academic and research implementations of vTPMs and other memory 
structure–based approaches, each with its own pros and cons. Trusted virtual machine 
usages are still evolving at the time of this writing; hence it’s not possible to be definitive. 
Chapter 8 covers aspects of the measured VM launch and some architectural elements. 
Chapter 3 covers in depth the matter of boot integrity and trusted boot of platforms and 
the hypervisors, as well as the associated trusted compute pools concept that aggregates 
systems so specific policies can be applied to those pools. The discussion also includes 
the solution architecture, and a snapshot of industry efforts to support the enabling 
of trusted compute pools. Chapter 4 covers the trust attestation or remote attestation 
architecture, including a reference implementation.
The Data Protection Usage Model
This usage model is about protecting data in the cloud that is at rest, in motion, and 
undergoing execution. It applies uniformly across infrastructure domains (compute, 
storage, and network). On the compute domain, the protection is for the virtual machines 
and workloads that have the applications, configurations, state, keys, secrets, and needed 
mechanisms to ensure confidentiality and integrity.
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For virtual machine and workload data protection, cloud user organizations need 
a method to securely place workloads into the cloud, as well as store and use data there. 
Current provisioning and bursting models include either storing the virtual machine and 
application images and data in the clear (unencrypted), or having these images and data 
encrypted by the keys controlled by the service provider—keys which are likely applied 
uniformly to all the tenants. But increasingly, virtual machine images—effectively, 
containers for operating system and application images, configuration files, data, and 
other entities—need confidentiality protection in a multi-tenant cloud environment. 
That is, images need to be encrypted by keys under tenant control, and also decrypted 
for provisioning by the keys under tenant control in a manner that is transparent to the 
cloud service provider. The usage model also calls for not only leveraging hardware for 
encryption and decryption but also ensuring that the service or entity acquiring the 
decryption keys does it on a need-to-know basis, is trusted and attested, and is running 
on a platform whose boot integrity has been attested. This provides a more effective last 
line of defense to protect from misuse or abuse by other tenants or cloud administrators. 
Chapter 8 covers this usage model for virtual machine protection, including a reference 
architecture and implementation.
The Run-time Integrity and Attestation Usage Model
Having a trusted foundation for the platform is extremely important. Roots of trust in 
hardware, and with a credible static and binary remote attestation process, ensure that 
a service provider can make assertions about the boot integrity of the platforms on 
which the tenant workloads execute. But that is only half the answer. The integrity of the 
platform could be assured at boot time, and remote attestation can measure and attest 
the state of healthiness at that point—only for integrity to be degraded and compromised 
at run time for a variety of reasons, such as configuration errors or, worse, the presence of 
run-time rootkits. These mechanisms compromise the integrity of the platforms and yet 
static binary remote attestation doesn’t catch them; instead, this situation calls for remote 
run-time attestation. However, for this solution to be viable, there needs to be a way of 
representing and approximating the run-time integrity of the system via a set of policies 
or properties. A system or platform stays healthy only to the extent that these properties 
stay healthy.
Determining what constitutes the minimum and sufficient set of properties that 
indicate the run-time health of a hypervisor or virtual machine monitor is a tough 
computer science problem that has long track record of research in software integrity. For 
example, if the integrity properties cover the system call table—the call table being the 
basis for measurement, monitoring, and attestation—a new rootkit can be deployed that 
manipulates other function pointers, such as device driver jump tables, and it will stay 
undetected. Clearly, there are no commercial implementations, since the threat vectors 
are too many to consider and modeling the threats, as well as mitigation, is still an active 
research area.
One promising research effort has been to define what are called “scoped invariants” 
as an important class of integrity properties. According to the authors of this research, 
scoped invariants are code or data with a constant value in some context (scope). For 
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example, one scoped invariant is the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) entry for page fault, 
containing a constant function pointer once the virtual machine monitor or operating 
system finishes initialization. Scoped invariants are building blocks for more general 
integrity properties, and they are amenable to integrity checking. A case study was 
done to identify a core set of scoped invariants of the open-source Xen virtual machine 
monitor. In addition to the IDT, another core invariant property was demonstrated in this 
research; the addressable memory limit of a guest OS must not include Xen’s code and 
data, and this proved indispensable for Xen’s guest isolation mechanism. Violation of this 
property can let an attacker modify a single byte in the Global Descriptor Table (GDT) to 
achieve a virtual machine escape goal.
At the current state of the art, run-time integrity monitoring and attestation is a 
broad and complex topic, and commercial implementations are still works in progress at 
many system and security organizations.
Trusted Cloud Value Proposition for Cloud Tenants
While a tenant organization’s compliance and security policies won’t change when IT 
processes migrate to the cloud, the way that organization enforces those policies and 
proves compliance will change significantly. For most compliance officers and infosec 
(information security) professionals, the cloud becomes, for practical purposes, a black 
box. In contrast, a cloud tenant that is landing a workload in a trusted pool can expect the 
following:
The assurance that the compute, network, and storage elements •	
in that segment of the cloud or the virtualized data center are 
trusted. The service provider or the management infrastructure 
asserts the integrity of the security and trust of these elements.
The assurance that the information (data and content) s stored, •	
processed, and migrated is always protected for confidentiality, 
integrity, and privacy.
The assurance that workloads and applications are not tampered •	
with, and that the infrastructure will launch and execute what 
is expected, and can provide a chain of trust that is rooted in 
hardware.
The assurance that the devices and users accessing the workloads •	
and services in these trusted clouds are authenticated, and that 
the workloads run on hardware with demonstrated integrity; 
likewise, for the controlling software. This ensures that services 
are being accessed over a reliable and secure network and 
location.
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The Advantages of Cloud Services on a Trusted  
Computing Chain
The advantages to delivering cloud services on computing resources that have a 
demonstrated chain of trust rooted in hardware include:
•	 Reducing the risks for co-residency. It ensures that the 
infrastructure is trusted and has demonstrated integrity. This 
prevents the launch and execution of untrusted components. 
It protects not only against malware but also from benign 
conditions, such as the improper migration or deployment 
of virtual machines. To illustrate, if a cloud orchestrator (like 
OpenStack) attempts to move virtual machines from an 
unsecured computing platform to a trusted one, the policy 
management software will prevent the incoming virtual machines 
from landing, since the action originated from an unsecured 
platform.
•	 Preventing the unsafe transit of secure virtual machines. In the 
same way that virtual machines arriving from an unsecured 
platform are not allowed to move to secured platforms, virtual 
machines originating on secured platforms are not allowed 
to move to unsecured ones. For instance, if an administrator 
attempted to transfer a secured virtual machine to a new server, 
the virtualization management console would first perform 
a policy check on the outgoing virtual machine and then 
measure the security configurations of the new server against 
accepted standards. If the new server does not meet the secure 
standards required to host the virtual machine, the virtualization 
management console or security policy engine prevents the 
virtual machine from migrating and logs the attempt.
•	 Maximizing and scaling operational efficiency by creating trusted 
pools of systems. Once platform trustworthiness can be measured, 
cloud providers can put such measurements to use by building 
trusted pools of systems, all with identical security profiles. 
Hypervisors can then make more efficient use of secure clouds, 
moving virtual machines with similar security profiles within 
zones of identically secured systems for load balancing and 
other administrative purposes—all the while protecting data in 
conformance with regulated standards and policies.
The authors believe that ubiquitous adoption of trusted computing chains will 
address a number of fundamental user concerns about cloud security that currently 
prevent many applications from being deployed in a cloud setting, thereby barring them 
from realizing the potential cost reductions that could stem from using cloud technology 
and limiting the greater business impact that would come from broader deployment.
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Summary
We covered the challenges of cloud security and compliance, as well as introduced the 
concept of trusted clouds. We discussed the needs for trusted clouds and introduced four 
usage models to enable a trusted computing infrastructure, the foundation for trusted 
clouds. These models provide a foundation for enhanced security that can evolve with 
new technologies from Intel and others in the hardware and software ecosystem.
There are no silver bullets for security, such as a single technology solving all 
problems, because the matter of security is a multifaceted one. But it is clear that a new 
set of security capabilities is needed, and that starts at the most foundational elements. 
Trusted platforms provide such a foundation. These platforms can provide:
Increased visibility of critical controlling software in the cloud •	
environment through attestation capabilities.
A new control point capable of identifying and enforcing local •	
known good configurations of the host operating environment, 
and able to report the resultant launch trust status to cloud and 
security management software for subsequent use.
In the next few chapters we will discuss each of the usage models in detail, including 
some solution architectures and technologies to bring them to reality.
